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Abstract

Australia's acceptance of refugees has a long and controversial history. As a nation, we have at
times accommodated and accepted multitudes of various individuals of differing faiths,
ethnicity and cultures into our society. Australia is indeed a cosmopolitan community of
indigenous and immigrant Australian citizens that have displayed periods of welcoming
refugees from war-torn states as under Malcolm Fraser's leadership in the late 1970s.
Concurrently, we have actively discriminated, sometimes implicitly, although not always,
against certain immigrants, including refugees from China and Papua and New Guinea during
the late 1960s and early 1970s. The community's perception of refugees has often curtailed
the more liberal accommodation of foreigners in need of refuge. The refugee policy and its
wholesale delivery by the government of the day has the ability to change and influence the
zeitgeist through government leadership, or can alternatively appeal to the popular interest
and continue to be voter orientated.
This thesis compares and contrasts the periods of the Bob Hawke and Paul Keating
administrations (1983-1996) and the John Howard administration (1996-2007). It investigates
this epoch to analyse similarities and differences between the Labor and Coalition
governments with respect to rhetoric and policy associated with refugees. Case study
examples are utilised to compare how Hawke and Keating as well as Howard issued rhetoric
and applied policy.
This study tested three main similarities between the Labor and Coalition governments. First,
within policy, both governments continued to uphold Australia's refugee intake quotas to a ten
per cent margin of the overall per annum immigration intake. In spite of this accomplishment,
more serious problems of resettlement issues were poorly administered by both parties.
Secondly, foreign policy and economic policy were major considerations for conservative and
centre-left governments during their respective periods of incumbency. These policies often
had a direct affect on refugee issues concerning who and how many refugees may be admitted
into Australia. Thirdly, the rhetoric employed by both party governments generally appealed to
their respective constituents although actual affects on policy implementation were marginal.
These findings illustrate research outcomes worthy of attention. Although Australia has a good
record in comparison to other net-receiving refugee countries, scope remains to increase the
nation's quota for future refugee admittance (on or offshore), in line with Australia's economic
prosperity. There has been, at select times, a window of opportunity for political leaders to
show strong leadership on this front. However, pragmatism driven by a following of public
opinion has tended to outweigh leaders interest in following such a course. Both, Hawke and
Howard had times in which they could have demonstrated elite moral fortitude and taken the
step of accepting wider and more numerous refugee quotas. Foreign policy implications and
domestic constituent considerations have lent their respective weight on the leaderships'
decisions. Hawke and Howard have become more pragmatic and less convictional as their
terms in office progressed.·
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Introduction

Despite public rhetoric to the contrary, there are a large number of similarities between the
policy approaches to refugee issues by the two major parties in modern Australian politics.
Convergence of political parties' constituency's and the 'battle for the middle ground' are
flourishing within Australian politics and the microcosm example of how this has impacted on
refugee policies is worthy of further investigation. Differences in policy, discussed below, are
primarily concerned with two aspects that include ideological divergence, individualism and
collectively, and ministerial intervention through leaders partiality to particular refugees.
The majority of contemporary opinion and research into refugee policy has highlighted the
severity of the Coalition's response to refugees in the last decade 1 {Brennan, 2003, pp. 47- 57;
Crock, Saul, Dastyari, 2006, pp. 113 - 122; Mares, 2002, pp. 121 - 133; Probyn, 2009}. From
this general consensus of academic and journalistic opinion, this thesis sets out to compare
and contrast the ALPs policy and rhetoric to ascertain if this opinion can be authenticated. The
thesis aims to prove this assertion is in fact a fallacy and realistically there is very little
divergence between ALP and Coalition policy on refugees.
The focus of this thesis is the similarities and differences associated with refugee policy and
party rhetoric between the governments of Hawke/Keating and Howard. Three principle areas
of the topic- boat people, visa categories and mandatory detention- will provide the basis of
comparison, as these areas of interest are the fundamentals of refugee policy and its
associated rhetoric and spin. Various case studies will be utilised within this discussion to
compare the two parties' policies and associated rhetoric.
The Australian public debate covering the multiple aspects of refugees is often a vexing
contemporary issue. The array of frequently interchangeable words and expressions employed
by the press often contributes to public confusion and misunderstanding of an already
complex issue 2 • To nullify any such misunderstandings in the context of this thesis, the author
seeks to define some key words and therefore ensure clarity of expression when discussing
this issue.

1

Alan Moir's and Bill Leak's political satire captures the cartoonists' impression of the leadership's

policies and rhetoric (See Brennan, 2003, p. 51).
2

ian Ward (2002, pp. 22 -23) argues the journalistic use of the term 1 illegal immigrants' to describe the

asylum seekers on board the Tampa framed the public debate that favoured the incumbents position.
See Romano, (2007, p. 245) for examples of journalist use of terminology.

1

Table 1.1 Terminologies
Serial

Terminology

1

Asylum seeker

2

Refugee status

3

Refugee policy

4

Mandatory detention

An asylum seeker is an applicant seeking potential refugee status (Jupp, 1994, p. 66). It must
be noted here that an asylum seeker is not deemed a 'refugee' until their status has been
evaluated and their claims substantiated in reference to the United Nations High Commission
for Refugees (UNHCR) 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol.

Asylum seekers entering

Australia without a visa do so unlawfully (Brennan, 2003, p. 5). This is expressed according to
Section 13, Paragraph 14, of the Migration Act 1958. To avoid misunderstanding, a person
within the migration zone prior to 1994 being an illegal entrant; is now referred to as an
unlawful non-citizen (Migration Act, 1958, s.14). This category is normally represented
rhetorically by the expression 'boat people' as well as referring to individuals that stay within
Australia past the limit of their visa entitlement. Asylum seekers entering the Australian
migration zone with a visa are referred to as 'lawful non-citizens' (Migration Act, 1958, s.13).
This category is represented normally by students and tourists arriving by air, who then may
claim asylum in Australia. An additional note is that asylum seekers are not differentiated by
the means or mode of transportation to the Australian continent. In other words, the crucial
distinction that requires explicit illustration is that it is unlawful to enter Australia without an
appropriate visa according to Australian law, but it is not (emphasis added) morally or ethically
unreasonable to do so. Therefore, mandatory detention is required for administrative
purposes only and should not be viewed as punitive in implementation

3

•

Refugee status is defined according to the 1951 Convention:
as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion; is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the

3

Critics (Maley, 2004, p. 151) (Mares, 2001, pp. 56 - 58) have stated that this policy is punitive in

implementation. The main assertion to justify this punitive labelling is the treatment of asylum seekers
whilst they are being held in detention and its /human cost' (Davies, 2007, p. 6).

2

country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (Article 1A, [2]).
Australia's accession to the 1967 Protocol in 1973 effectively expanded the terms that defined
refugee status. Article I, paragraphs 2 and 3 removed the restrictions placed on state
signatories of the 1951 Convention. Paragraph two omitted the time restriction which was
stipulated in the 1951 Convention that meant events occurring before 1 January 1951 were a
requirement for refugee status in acknowledgement that more recent events have caused
1

substantial refugee flows, commonly termed push factors'.

In addition, paragraph three

removes any geographical restrictions placed on signatories of the original Convention. Thus
not only European origin refugees may be considered for asylum and refuge (Cutts, 2004, p. 6;
see Figure 1.2 below).
In light of the international obligations highlighted above, it is important to note that
recommendation E (echo) of the convention embodies the ethos and spirit of the convention
that urges this formal status as a bench mark. Countries ratifying or acceding to the convention
should interpret this as the minimum standard for the treatment and processing of refugees
(McMaster, 2002, p. 33).
Refugee policy is the portion of the larger immigration portfolio that is administered by the
federal government that explicitly pertains to humanitarian and person in exile policies.
Burnside, (2007, p. 252) however draws an apt distinction that he expresses succinctly as:
Immigration policy is a reflection of demographic, social and economic
considerations which cause a country to say they would like this many people, or
of this or that skill base, this or that ethnic origin. Refugees have quite a different
claim to our hospitality. Refugees are fleeing persecution, torture or death in a
place which is unsafe, and they seek [our] protection.
It is critical to define this distinction, as visa categories will be discussed in Chapter three. For
the period under review, three basic categories of immigration policy exist. These consist of
family, skilled and humanitarian (Lloyd, 1993, p. 77). Each category has variations of subcategories that fluctuate in actual intake numbers and quotas set by the Department of
Immigration (see Figure 1.1 below). Thus, putting the family and skilled categories to one side,
the humanitarian category is divided into three components under the Hawke administration
which included a Convention refugee total (UNHCR vetted offshore refugees), a special
humanitarian total (persons who do not meet the strictly 1951 convention parameters for
refugee status) and a special assistance program (introduced in 1991 and removed in 1996 to
deal with unique events - such as the Kosovo crisis). It is important to note that a specific

3

category was not set aside for 'onshore arrivals', this inadvertently demonstrates the
diminutive size of this unpredictable element within the humanitarian category.

Howard's

term in office saw the abolition of the final category in 1996, leaving just the first two
aforementioned categories in use (Jupp, 2003, p. 84).
Figure l.llmmigration and Refugee Policy Categories

1951 Convention
Refugee Category

Special
Humanitarian
Category
Department of
Immigration and
Citizenship (DIC)

Special Assistance
Programme (19911996)
Immigration Policy
(Economic and
Family)

Various schemes
and categories

Mandatory detention is authorised by the Migration Act 1958 (Migration Act_ 1958, s.189).
Part 2, Division 7, Section 189 outlines the circumstances that permit the detention of unlawful
non-citizens who are either, seeking to access the migration zone or, are within the migration
zone by an authorised officer. Section 176 states that:
This Division is enacted because the Parliament considers that it is in the national
interest that each non-citizen who is a designated person should be kept in
immigration detention until he or she:
(a) leaves Australia; or
(b) is given a visa.
Therefore under the Migration Act 1958 unlawful non-citizens (referred to above as
designated person) may be detained until their claim has been substantiated or revoked. If
substantiated they are to be issued a visa and released into the community. If revoked they are
to be deported from Australia as soon as practicable (McMaster, 2002, p. 67).

4

Figure 1.2 International and Australian legislation Timeline

1989 Migration
1958 Migration
1950

Act

Act amendment

2001 Border

and regulations

Protection Act

I

I

J

UN 1951

UN 1967

1992 legislation

Convention

Protocol

introduced~

Fiscal

restructure of
department

Academic and legislative interpretations are necessary to orientate the reader in light of the
author's viewpoint. Newspaper articles, internet blogs and television sound bites all commonly
contain these terms; however, at times they are taken out of context within the Australian
press.
The current financial downturn (global financial crisis) for the developed world which
encompasses huge monetary shortfalls and billions of dollars that are earmarked for the
United Nations from donor countries (Australia included) presents a dilemma for current
international refugee programs. These financial obligations are required by international
organisations such as UNHCR for ongoing coordination of underdeveloped and developing
country refugee resettlement plans. This reduction, by contributing countries, in fiscal support
will have a detrimental effect on global UN operations. In 2009 alone; twelve humanitarian
camps were closed in Zimbabwe (UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency, 2009).
Secondly, with climate change displacing indigenous people of the pacific rim due to rising sea
levels, the desertification of China making vast areas uninhabitable, the enlarging arid areas of
Africa (sub Sahara) reducing the bread basket of the world; and subsequently, the continued
expediential population growth in the underdeveloped and developing world will undoubtedly
have the potential to place more stress on certain developed nations. Historically, Australia,
Canada and the United States of America have accepted large numbers of UNHCR
humanitarian refugees for permanent resettlement (Phillips, 2009, p. 3).
Furthermore, the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan, post 2006, and the continuing
humanitarian crisis in Darfur linked with the ongoing statelessness of Somalia are continuing to
displace and marginalise groups in need of resettlement. As one case example highlights,
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contemporary reports show that Iraq has an infancy death rate close to the highest in the
world 4 (Global Health Atlas, 2009}; also one in every three people of Iraq's population does not
have access to clean drinking water (Singer, 2007}.

If so, due to geographical proximity,

refugee flows and asylum seeker surges may well result in external pressure on Australia to
accept a greater number of potential political, religious, and economic refugees.
Refugees, asylum seekers and 'persons of concern', a catch all category that encompasses
UNHCR designated individuals; continue to grow in numbers annually. Phillips (2009, p. 4}
quotes UNHCR statistics in 2009 that demonstrate the expediential growth in displaced people
around the globe. In 1951, there was an estimated 1.5 million refugees internationally; in
1980, this figure had grown to 8.2 million. In 2007, UNHCR estimates that there are 11.7
million refugees worldwide. Despite international efforts to mitigate and reduce numbers of
'people of concern', their numbers continue to increase and force 'receiving' countries such as
Australia to adapt their policies (Phillips, 2009, p. 4}.
The methodology of comparative analysis has been utilised to explore the proposed
hypothesis. This method was chosen as it allows the author to compare and contrast both the
policy and rhetoric within a closed universe. Various cases, that demonstrate real world
examples, are thus able to be juxtaposed from within the given timeframe between 1983, the
first year of Hawke's Labor government, until 2007 and the conclusion of Howard's tenure in
public office.
This primary system was developed by John Stuart Mill in his study 'A System of Logic (1843}'.
Kernan (2008, p. 72} paraphrases this concept as 'the basic idea is that the comparing of cases
can be used to detect commonalities between cases and variables'. This study will utilise both
an assessment of the similarities and discuss the differences found between the parties' under
consideration. Both similarities and differences will be considered; this is due to the need to
expose the reader to both party convergence and divergence in respect to both policy and
rhetoric. So, conclusions will be drawn from observed inferences from both common and
different case study outcomes.
To reach a valid and comprehensive conclusion, the 'art of case comparison, which includes
what, when and how to compare' will rely on the author's diversity of case selection to draw
4

Andrew Buncombe of the UK newspaper, The Independent reports that the growth of infant mortality

in Iraq over the last decade has been growing at higher rates than sub-Sharan Africa due to the two
conflicts and the consequent economic sanctions. Afghanistan has the second highest infant mortality
rate in the world (Buncombe, 2007).
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reasonable conclusions that can be generally applied across the topic (Keman, 2008, p. 64). To
ensure accuracy in comparing selected cases, the author has taken note of external forces that
may affect case selection such as; the state of the economy and parochial cultural sensitivity.
However; a caveat must be expressed that, due to the extent of the time period under review,
some variations in circumstance have been acknowledged, but omitted from this study.
The major results of this study show that there is a continued willingness for party policy
convergence in regards to the refugee issue despite the use of rhetoric and spin stating the
contrary. Contemporary refugee policy continues to be an issue that is mutually supported by
both major Australian political parties.
The strong rhetoric displayed by the Coalition in contrast to the more reduced levels of
rhetoric displayed by the ALP has had little effect on the numbers of asylum seekers admitted
to Australia as bona fide 1951 Convention Refugees. Furthermore, rhetoric associated with
refugee policy is linked with parties' constituents and has popular appeal built into its delivery.
Thirdly, changes that have occurred to policy that have been impacted on by external factors
(interest groups, economic climate, foreign/international relations) have been accompanied
with larger amounts of rhetoric or political spin. This is, in part, due to the growth of the
public relations sector and the management of political messages to the public.
This comparison has also highlighted the tendency for political leaders to moderate their
inherent convictions to more pragmatic ideals as their term in office grew. Pragmatism is
displayed by both leaders' approaches to refugee policy late in their respective terms.
Examples illustrate Max Weber's theory of leadership ethos development (Anson, 1991, p. 64).
Chapter One analyses the history and development of Australian Refugee policy. It traces the
development of bipartisan policy and the associated party rhetoric from the period of
Australia's acceptance of responsibility in 1954 until Australia's late twentieth century change
of government.

It highlights and signposts the implicit expressions of Australians attitude

towards refugees and assisted immigrants as well as drawing attention to major political
turning points in history that have influenced modern policy. Chapter Two analyses the most
prominent differences between the major political parties.

Howard's strong rhetoric is

compared with Hawke's. For example, Howard's rhetoric is focused on border security and
national sovereignty and therefore often sidelines the resettlement and humanitarian
component of official party policy. Alternatively, Hawke's rhetoric is complex, in that he was
seen as sympathetic towards Chinese students in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square

7

massacre in 1989 and decisively harsh to what he saw as Cambodian economic refugees in
1991. The comparison of media management and party rhetoric again signifies the
convergence of the parties under review.

Chapter Three examines the public policy of

refugees within immigration policy. Policy is continuing to enjoy bipartisan support. Both
major parties ascribe to the continuance of initial mandatory detention for administrative
reasons. In addition, refugee intake levels, of approximately ten per cent of the immigration
quota, have remained steady under both parties. Off shore processing of refugees is the
preferred method of refugee arrival and coincided with state based initiatives that administer
and accommodate new arrivals into the community.

8

Chapter One
Historical Policy and Rhetoric: Towards Refugee Acceptance
Introduction:
Contextualising Australia's historical track record is essential to understanding contemporary
policy and party rhetoric. By doing so, we can recognise patterns, commonalities and
differences more readily. Some of these issues are reoccurring; they are prominent in both the
historical narrative of our refugee policy and the contemporary debate, and therefore warrant
specific mention. They include employment, foreign affairs and the mass media.
This chapter examines three distinct periods leading up to the post 1983 acceptance of peoplein-need for immigration and humanitarian entry into Australia as defined by numerous
academics (Jupp, 2002, pp. 5 - 37; Neumann, 2005, pp. 15 - 42; Lusher, 2007, pp. 9 - 21).
Firstly, the era between 1954 and 1966 shows the rubric and attitude associated with the
White Australia Policy. Secondly, the epoch between 1966 and 1973 expresses the gradual
changes to policy and opinion that followed global change in attitudes towards nonEuropeans. Following this period of contestation, an analysis of policy and style takes a critical
look at how Australia adapted and transformed its objectives to meet contemporary outlooks,
including the process of abolishing the White Australia Policy {1973-1983). The chapter
concludes with a brief analysis of Australia's record in relation to refugee advocate groups
prior to the main period under review in this thesis {1983- 2007).
Milieu to Australia's Refugee Strategy: 1901- 1954
Linklater {2008, p. 544) describes the concept of political community as a group of members
that are bound together by loyalty and trust. Common linkage to a shared past and experience,
through economic hardship or warfare, is often the core element that provides social and
political integration within a community.

Linklater also advocates that members of a

community prefer to share political power and material resources within their own group,
thereby circumventing non-members. In correlation with this concept of political community is
the definition of what constitutes identifiable boundaries to a given community. In the current
era of the pre-eminence of nation states and nationalism, political communities associate the
extent of their responsibilities with national borders. In Australia's case, these are readily
identifiable. Although extensive, Australia's borders do not constitute a contiguous landmass
with a neighbouring country or political community. Linklater {2008, p. 154) argues that
citizens of one political community should extend their moral and ethical responsibility beyond

9

their nation's borders and share 'duties and obligations towards non-citizens as they do
towards their fellow citizens'. This concept can be demonstrated in the Australian context by
our accession to both the United Nations 1951 Convention and the United Nations 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (United Nation High Commission for Refugees
[UNHCR], n.d.).
The prelude of immigration policy prior to Australia joining the international community's
formal acknowledgement of refugees sheds light on the continuity of the White Australia
Policy. Parliamentary discussions during the turn of the century over immigration policy
concerned a number of issues that resonate in the contemporary public debate. Lawrence
(2007, p. 177) quotes Western Australia's premier, Sir John Forrest, during the 1901 debates
over the introduction of the bill and subsequent Immigration Restriction Act 1901:
We desire that this country shall not be overrun with races whose sympathies,
manners and customs and religion are not ours. There is another reason ... There
are millions of them, and if we do not place some restrictions on them, they will
overrun the country.
This quote raises two perceived threats to the Australian nation. Firstly, the notion of
'otherness', note the use of us, we, them. Secondly, the idea of a large amount of foreign
people wishing to reside in Australia. The debate focused on immigrants' racial inferiority,
their immorality, their non-Christian religious background and fear that the 'other' would not
integrate into the existing communitl.
Furthermore, this rhetoric was not accompanied by any official treaties, agreements or
provisions recognising the needs of disadvantaged, often disillusioned and desperate displaced
persons. With no official recognition and little to no foreign public empathy, migration of
repressed individuals was extremely limited. In fact, Neumann (2004, p. 15) highlights the
extremely low number of non Anglo Saxon people arriving in Australia within the first three
decades after federation {1901-1931). White Australia Policy migrants excluded, Australia only
accepted some two thousand Jewish migrants, two thousand White Russian migrants and a
little over 23,000 anti-fascist Italian migrants prior to. the 1930s mass exodus of Jews from

5

Comparatively, The United States of America and Canada displayed correlation with Australia's

immigration program.

Both illustrated a preference for British and west European migration and

eventually widened the intake to include southern and eastern Europeans. Levels of Asian immigration
were restricted with conservatives worried about the preserving the existing monocultural English
ethos. Public debates also included various levels of social Darwinism during the early twentieth century
(See Parkin and Hardcastle, 1993, pp. 42- 48).
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Western Europe. A direct example of the rhetoric expressed above was demonstrated by the
Department of Interior in 1938. With official concerns mounting with the number of Jewish
applicants requesting visas, the Department of Immigration amended its application forms to
specifically denote if applicants were ethnically Jewish. This administrative detail and the
aforementioned debates illustrate formal concern over who was entering Australia at this very
early stage of our national history.
A Bipartisan White Australia Policy: 1954- 1966

Although the White Australia Policy was the cornerstone of the Federation's immigration
program, other factors shaped and formed Australia's response to Europe's post war refugee
crisis in 1947. The core roots of this Australian policy following the Second World War derived
from two main factors: sentiment that Australia must grow its population in order to maintain
its security, aptly described in 1938 by Governor-General Lord Gowrie as 'populate or perish'
(Neumann, 2004, p. 16); and a failure by the government to attract enough Anglo-Celtic
immigrants which lead to a widening of ethnic origins allowed entry under immigration
programs.
Assisted migration arrangements with Italy, Germany, Greece and Austria were an effective
method to achieve the aim of populating to avoid perishing. By expanding their search criteria
to include a limited number of Jews and 'Baits' - displaced Europeans from the Baltic states
and 'escapees' - Eastern Europeans fleeing the communist wave gained entry to Australia.
Australia resettled more than a quarter of a million refugees in the first fifteen years following
the Second World War; second only to the USA for this period {Neumann, 2004, p. 43). Two
examples of Australia's commitment to resettlement include:

accepting anti-communist

refugees from the former Hungry, and Czechoslovakian refugees that were fleeing from
politico-military action from existing soviet states.
The reformist Hungarian government of Prime Minister Nagi opted to withdraw itself from the
Warsaw Pact in November 1956. These actions lead to a Soviet crackdown that quashed the
rebellious movement and put a conformist government in command. The resulting exodus of
two hundred thousand Hungarians provided Australia with an opportunity to accept anticommunist refugees. The Immigration Minister's response incorporated the resettling of
14,000 Hungarian refugees by 1959. Furthermore, Australia admitted 6,000 Czechs and
Slovakians following the aggression of five Warsaw Pact militaries towards Czechoslovakia in
1968. These factors and their examples are derived from political pressure from Australia's
existing domestic constituents. This political pressure was demonstrated by the strict
11

requirements that immigration officials imposed on refugees seeking resettlement in Australia.
Neumann (2004, p. 81) suggests that 'non-British settlers were young, educated and healthy,
and ideally, possessed certain racial features. Australian selection teams preferred vigorous,
flaxen-haired, fair-skinned and blue-eyed young men and women from the Baltic States'. The
selectors did not accept southern European and olive-skin people; they also rejected refugees
from Yugoslavia, Morocco and Bulgaria, who often had come from the concentration camps of
Nazi Germany.
This distinction aptly reflects Australia's contemporary aversion to the admittance of refugees
purely on a humanitarian record

6

•

New Zealand's Prime Minister at the time, Walter Nash,

observed the following: 'the extent to which any country can receive refugees depends on the
good will and assistance which the residents of that country are prepared to offer' (Neumann,
2004, p. 39). This quote is in line with the realist theory that implies states rarely, if ever, act
simply in terms of human rights considerations (Brown, 2008, p. 514) and is categorised by
Jupp (2002, p. 63) as a period of 'nation building through assimilation'. Therefore prior to
1951, Australia's economic interests maintained priority without a viable international treaty
to resettle refugees on the basis of humanitarian need.
The White Australia Policy becomes Contested Ground: 1966- 1973

Australia's first relaxation of the White Australia policy occurred in 1966. That year saw
immigration laws changed to allow entry of non-Europeans, and with that the beginning of the
end of the policy. Official policy changed due to local anti-racist movements, some
international embarrassment, and the economic impracticality of the policy (Vrachnas, 2008,
p. 12; Documenting a Democracy, n.d.). Although policy changed slightly to accept a new visa
category of 'non-Europeans with special skills' into Australia, strong anti-Asian/African
emotion still existed in Australia's formal policy. This point is illustrated by the contrast
between Hong Kong's Chinese refugees and British nationals feeling the pressure of
decolonisation both in South-East Asia and Africa. Initially Australia dismissed the concept that
Chinese refugees were refugees under the protection of the UNHCR mandate

6

7

•

However, a

Historical evidence demonstrates Australia's prejudicial behaviour in not accepting certain

ethnic/religious/political background populations over other more 'suitable' sectors of the international
community. The emphasis lies with their 'suitability' and not their basis of 'need' for state protection
(Neumann, 2004, p. 51).
7

Australia had not acceded to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees until 1973 and as
such Chinese refugees were outside Australia's international legal obligations (Neumann, 2004, p. 112).
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strong stance that Australia did not support the British colony (Hong Kong) was to be avoided
as a self attentive Australia did not wish to draw international attention to its official
immigration policy. The active approach applied to British immigrants leaving Kenya, Indonesia
and Singapore, although not explicit in its delivery, was to welcome and support them via
assisted passage and efficient handling by department officials. An important observation of
the rhetoric used in framing official statements and media releases reflects the established
contemporary bias. Any referral to applications for refugee status includes their suitability to
'integrate' into Australian society. These factors often included the refugees' ability to speak
English, their dress, bearing and appearance, and their religion. Notably, as Neumann (2007,
pp. 32 - 50) argues in this rhetoric that officials were basing assessments on the individuals'
ability to assimilate into the existing Australian culture and not their political, economic or
social situation from their country of origin or of first refuge. The residing under-current began
to be swept aside during an Australian Labor Party reshuffle in 1967 that ushered in Gough
Whitlam and saw the removal of the 'Old Guard' led by Arthur Calwell. Calwell's attitude was
aptly displayed by his infamous quote 'two wong's don't make a white' (Vrachnas, 2008, p. 11).
Understanding why Australia grappled with its relaxation of the White Australia Policy is
complex and can be best illustrated through a case example. A key note is that Australia was
not at the time beholden to the United Nations 1967 Protocol that removed the time and
geographical limitations from the existing international convention (Neumann, 2007, pp. 21-

29). In February 1969, eight West Papuans made a claim for asylum having reached an island
within the Torres Strait of Australia. Recognising that some of these West Papuans were likely
to be subjected to political repression due to their advocacy for independence from Indonesia,
Australia granted a limited number of five year renewable residency permits rather than
forcibly removing them back to Indonesia. However, this particular group of West Papuans
were advised to request asylum in Papuan and New Guinea (PNG), at the time administered by
Australia but governed from the Parliament in Port Moresby, as the Australian government
had other considerations to take into account. These considerations included Indonesia's
perception and relationship with Australia if officials decided to grant asylum to members of
its community. The prime minister's policy directive was that 'there was to be no trouble with
the Indonesians over West Irian' (West Papua) (Neumann, 2007, P. 22). By having the asylum
seekers claim for asylum in PNG, Australian officials achieved two objectives; they removed
the West Papuans from direct access to the Australian press and in doing so, maintained their
positive relationship with Indonesian officials. In addition they did not compromise the existing
White Australia Policy. This period of contestation ended with the Federal government
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recognising wider boundaries for refugee status by acceding to the UN 1967 Protocol in 1973
(Neumann, 2007, p. 26). Coincidently, Australia granted the territory of PNG self-governance
just prior to acceding to the Refugee Protocol. Ministerial rhetoric at this time reflected further
tensions within the system. The Minister for External Territories, Charles Barns, expressed the
opinion that the West Papuans deportation to West Papua (Indonesia) should be considered as
this option would be favourable to Australia's bilateral relationship with Indonesia. However, a
member of his own department, Tim Besley, had noted the asylum seekers did not wish to be
deported to PNG and therefore should not be forced against their will (likewise they should
not be forced to return to Indonesia). This conflict within one government department
illustrates the wider divide within the Australian Government (and society) at the time.
Post White Australia: Developing a Refugee Policy 1973 - 1983

The White Australia policy was officially dismantled in 1973 (Vrachnas, 2008, p. 12). The
Immigration Minister, AI Grassby, speaking about Australia's immigration policy in Manilla
declared in 1973: 'It is dea_d, give me a shovel and I will bury it' (Tavan, 2004, p. 564). This act
coincided with Australia's accession of the 1967 Protocol which acknowledged the removal of
geographical and chronological restrictions to the status of refugees implied by the 1951
Convention. The second quarter of 1973 marked a dramatic change in Australia's policy and
saw the introduction of a quota system for the intake of refugees

8

.

This realignment saw an

arguably independent refugee policy that had been hitherto a mere subsidiary of immigration
policy.

Neumann (2004, p. 111) argues that for the first time international law guided

Australian refugee and asylum seeker policy and not a self interested nation building policy
that focused on population expansion implemented by a strict selection criteria method. This
policy has continued hitherto the present day with recent data from UNHCR confirming
Australia's continued support to international supra organisations, such as the United Nations
and humanitarian government organisations such as AusAID. Official figures from 2006 show
that Australia donated, (US) $13,483,764.00 to UNHCR and resettled a total of 13,400
refugees; the second largest national commitment to resettlement of refugees behind the
United States in the international community (United Nations High Commission for Refugees

8

Australia's quota system refers to the nation's limit on the number of refugees accepted from all

categories. This includes both off and onshore and any special assistance refugees. This limit is flexible
and set by ministerial discretion, although historically it has remained at 10 per cent of the overall
immigration figure (See Crock & Saul, 2002, pp. 9-12).
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[UNHCR], n.d.)

9

•

However, Viviani (1980, pp. 28-29) displays a host of factors that determined

policy over this mid 1970s period. Firstly, after a change of government federally in 1975, the
Coalition still had the difficult task of structuring a policy that balanced domestic criticism and
fear of Indochinese refugees in a period of high unemployment with regional government
pressure to increase refugee intake. The immigration and ethnic affairs minister, Michael
Mackellar, addressed this issue with a bilateral agreement with the United States that
increased Australia's intake (quota) to 9,000 alongside a US agreement to increase its intake to
25,000 in 1978/79. This appeasement of Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean officials

10

coincided with both a regional tour that aimed at encouraging countries of first asylum to 'hold
boats' in order for Australian officials to process 'in country', and strong rhetoric from the
Australian government. This took the form of minister Mackellar announcing 'strong action'
-

would be taken and 'long term imprisonment or deportation' could occur against so-called
'queue jumpers'. These remarks were broadcast via Radio Australia to South East Asia as a
deterrent to further boat departures as well as to placate domestic public opinion.
Furthermore, the immigration minister released a statement on refugee policy. The statement
outlined Australia's obligations towards refugees, but also stipulated the established position
that the decision to accept refugees must always remain with the government (Viviani, 1980,
p. 12). This statement shows firstly Australia's commitment to accept humanitarian refugees in
line with its duties as a member of the international community, although retaining its
sovereign right to adjust the quota of refugees accepted at any time. This period of policy
reform continued under ian Macphee, (Mackellar's replacement) and included new visa
categories that did not specify individual countries (Jupp, 2002, p. 186). Amnesties for visa
over stayers, budget increases for educational assistance programs (English language) and a
general increase in refugee settlement numbers all pointed towards a more humanitarian
outlook for Australia's refugee policy under the Fraser Government (Jupp, 2002, p. 41). These
machinations produced a firmer and more codified refugee policy.

9

Total numbers of asylum seekers fleeing into Pakistan from Afghanistan far outweigh this figure

(hundreds ofthousands in border camps are administered by UNHCR). However, these refugees are not
being permanently resettled in that country of refuge as it is not a signatory of the UN 1951 Convention
(Bell (et al), 2008, p. 142).
Viviani (1980, p. 13) states Malaysia and Thailand, as countries of first asylum, were receiving the

10

majority of the refugee flow from Vietnam. Prior to the increased quota from Australia, these countries
were concerned with the rate of permanent resettlement to Australia.

15

After this distinct period of liberal accommodation of refugees, Geoffrey Blainey's commene

1

reflected what a variety of politicians and judges thought at the time: 'We should continue to
welcome a variety of Asian immigrants, but they should come on our terms, through our
choosing, and in numbers with which our society can cope' {Vrachnas, 2008, p. 14). However,
in the face of this criticism and in reply to Professor Blainey's attack on multiculturalism in
1984, the Labor Minister for Immigration, Mr West made slight adjustments in refugee policies
to cater for the repressive, right wing governments of Central America. Indochinese refugees
still dominated policy during 1983 and 1984 with 60 per cent falling into the family reunion
category and 25 per cent falling into the humanitarian category {Jupp, 2002, p. 48). This policy
adjustment illustrates the Hawke government's commitment to humanitarian and family
reunion programs in refugee policy. As general immigration levels declined over this period,
special status and humanitarian intake levels remained constant. McMaster {2002, p. 53)
points out that the early 1980s reflected a tension between economic rationalists, concerned
with meeting Australia's needs for growth and sustained development and those ethnic lobby
groups supporting an altruistic approach to Australia's immigration policy. Katherine Betts
{quoted in Jupp, 1993, p. 222) argued that immigration policy 'was to be a means, not of
meeting Australia's own needs for defence or economic growth, but expressing humanitarian,
internationalist and anti-racist values and, in doing so, meeting other peoples needs'. The early
1980s contrasts Australia's elite social groups emphasising the need to be selective and
restrictive in immigration policy, due to a period of high unemployment and economic
downturn,

and

official

bipartisan

government

policy

reflecting

Australia's

accommodate Asian refugees in line with our international commitments and

need

to

growing

regional embedment. This period is suitably categorised by Jupp {2002, p. 63) as 'welfare
resettlement and multiculturalism'. However, this period of general acceptance was replaced
with an ever narrower concept of refugee policy by the West. Hanquet {1997, p. 19) argues
that the resettlement package that had defined refugee policy for western nations from the
1970s was gradually being replaced with policies of prevention and repatriation during the
1990s.
A reaction to the new government direction was the movement of a more mobilised, religious
and non government orientated political action that advocated a desire to reverse restrictive

11

History Professor Geoffrey Blainey argued that it was in the national interest that cultural assimilation

should be given priority over ethnic groups of a monocultural persuasion (Betts, 1993, pp. 223- 228).
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refugee policies. By the time the Hawke government had won its second election in December
1984, the Federal government had reduced its refugee intake quota from 21,000 to just over
11,000. In addition funding was cut, removing more than half a million dollars from the
program (Matheson, 1987, p. 10). Research conducted by the Refugee Council of Australia in
1986 suggested that 'mainly women and children would suffer as a result' of the budgetary
cuts to UNHCR. Australian churches and religious agencies shifted their focus during this
period from their traditional role of coordinating the resettlement of refugees, which they
continued to facilitate, but also mobilised a more political non partisan approach to affect
changes to refugee policy (Ferris, 1987, p. 5).

The main initiative of these political agitations

was to lobby the government on its plans to address the root causes of refugee situations, and
for the government to seek 'durable solutions' to mitigate international refugee flows. The
-

same aims and outcomes remain firmly within these lobbyist groups' mission priorities today.
The Conference of Religious Leaders Institutes (NSW) refugee lobby kit utilises the advocacy of
its members to achieve a more humanitarian role for policy and to additionally educate the
Australian population on refugee issues (Conference of Leaders of Religious Institutes, 2007).
Indeed the Australian Council of Churches and NGOs such as the Edmund Rice association
(Rice, 2007) and the Refugee Council of Australia (The Refugee Council of Australia, 2009) have
been staunch critics of bipartisan rhetoric commonly used in the refugee debate.

Conclusion
Throughout the period 1954- 1983 Australia has, at times, accepted and welcomed refugees
escaping persecution and repression. As a collective the nation has at times deterred and
sidelined particular refugees that have been deemed as 'illegal' or 'queue jumping' in their
efforts to secure a peaceful future. This has been a direct result of government leadership, and
this is paramount when dealing with international refugee crisis that develop and in shaping
public reception and education of these events. Prime ministers and ministers have shaped
policy in accordance with good governance and strong leadership combined with incremental
changes in societal values. This leadership is the personification of ideological perspective,
although it is occasionally tainted with progressive, forward thinking, breaks from normal
traditions and at times a continued endorsement of conservative party policy. Australia has
not been alone in its immigration policy development; the nation's agitations have been
replicated in other nations touched by British imperial colonialism. Political rhetoric has also
had substantial impact on the refugee debate that has often been aligned with appeasing
regional powers or local members to mitigate international criticism and placate concerned
voters.
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Chapter Two
Party Rhetoric in Contrast
Introduction:
Political parties are continually adapting to technological advances and the ever quickening
media cycle. This chapter discusses the importance of media management and political spin in
modern western society, in particular as it has been used to sell party positioning on refugee
policies. The relevance to both the policy cycle and the election cycle is undisputed. Howard
and Hawke utilised tough talk to emphasise their position in relation to the admittance of boat
people, their stance on detention and their respective positions on visa categories. Their
alignment is somewhat startling and effectively illustrates the parties' convergence and
continued bipartisan support of refugee policy.
An effective foreshadowing of leadership rhetoric on refugee policy took place in 1977 under
the prime ministership of Malcolm Fraser. Due to the fallout from the regions political activism
the then ACTU president, Bob Hawke, advocated action that would cease the flow of boats to
Australia. He argued that '(a)ny sovereign country has the right to determine how it will
exercise its compassion and how it will increase its population' (Errington and van Onselen,
2007, p. 77). The implicit reference to Australia's international obligations under the UN
Refugee Convention and Protocol displays how the union leadership is confusing Burnsides
2

distinction between refugee policy and immigration policl ; however, as Hawke was calling to
stem the flow of anti-communist refugees exiting Vietnam post the conflicts conclusion, he
may have been playing a political card and following Whitlam's spin on right-wing refugees.
Hawke's quotation also indicates his future tendency for oscillation in immigration and refugee
policies (McMaster, 2002, p. 55). Howard's rhetoric at this time is also insightful. Errington and
van Onselen (2007, p. 77) note an unconfirmed conversation that the new Coalition minister
for business and consumer affairs had with his PM after a cabinet meeting that related to
Australia's response to the decades (1970) peak in boat flows of asylum seekers. The relatively
new cabinet member asked Fraser, 'You're not going to take too many of these people, ... are
you?' Howard denies this conversation took place; he has no recollection of this discussion.
Malcolm Fraser, however, confirms this conversation did occur in a corridor in May of 1977
12

Burnside essentially describes the distinction between refugee policy and immigration policy as the

former group is fleeing torture, persecution and death. They seek protection in another nation state
under the obligations of that state to abide by international conventions providing refuge. The latter,
reflect a nations demographic, economic and social considerations when choosing who to admit to the
nation for its continuing economic prosperity and social composition (Burnside, 2007, pp. 252- 253).
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following a cabinet meeting, in an interview with The Australian that coincided with the
release of the 1977 Cabinet papers (Steketee, 2008). If Errington and van Onselen have
recorded an accurate version of this account, one could foresee why the future PM would be
conservative in his discussions about boat people and refugees in general. These attitudes also
give light to the continued level of refugee admittance to Australia in the period under review.
Politicking in Modernity: Political Messages

Contemporary Australian politics is as much about public relations (PR) as it is about the
pursuit of efficient public policy (Errington and Miragliotta, 2007, p. 81). The evolution of a PR
state 13, and the subsequent adaptation of politicians to new media, necessitates political spin
(Ward, 1995, p. 177). Senior Australian journalist Michelle Grattan describes spin as - 'the
highly professional selling of the political message that involves maximum management and
manipulation of the media' (Grattan, 1998, p. 34). As Errington and Miragliotta (2007, p. 101)
note: politicians and their associated media advisors are in a constant negotiation with the
Australian press. The press, referred to as the 'fourth estate' notionally ascribe to the delivery
of accurate and unbiased information to the Australian populace. Politicians aim to be
represented in the best possible light to their electorates in order to be seen as in touch and
connected to their constituents (McNair, 2007, p. 121). These two objectives do not always
correlate and therefore an ongoing competition exists. This inherent struggle is supported by
an interdependence that both parties rely on each other for traction. The free press provide,
via broadcast, online and print media, the greatest coverage of political decisions and new
policy to the Australian people (Tiffen, 2006, pp. 101 - 102). Alternatively, the government
provides the press with its greatest source of new information for public dissemination and
therefore drive its income source of associated advertising for commercial agencies (Howard,
2009). Errington and Miragliotta (2007, p. 82), Grattan (1998, p. 38), Ester (2008, p. 6) and
Ward (2002, p. 35) suggest that the equation is not equal, in that the government holds the
upper hand in this relationship by its ability to influence how, when and what is reported by
the media. Furthermore they raise a concern that explores the political saleability of public
policy. They argue that 'news management has became a major preoccupation for the

13

lan Ward expresses that 'public relations undoubtedly has had a substantial impact on the gathering

and production of print and broadcast news'. He argues that 'many journalists are readily captured by
the official or bureaucratic sources upon which they routinely rely on for information'. Ward advocates
this industry evolution is aimed at 'influencing and even dictating' the news that is reported (Ward,

1995, p.177).
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government' and therefore requires 'important considerations' in the development of future
policy.
This notion of political saleability reflects the growth of such agencies as Hawke and Keating's
NMLS or aNiMaLS, the National Media Liaison Service and the Howard's Government
Members' Secretariat (GMS) (Barns, 2005, pp. 9-18). These consecutive elements help to,
among other aspects, disseminate relevant political information from the incumbent. Both the
ALP and the Coalition deny that they are purely political tools for the wholesale of partisan
policy. Retrospective analysis from Barns (a former Liberal staffer) and critical analysis from
academic political scientists and commentators, van Onselen and Errington counter weigh this
party proposition.
So, the media coverage of political debate has implications for political parties. This chapter
highlights how the aforementioned agencies, political leaders and ministers manage and utilise
rhetoric in order to gain electoral advantage with their constituents, advance their vision for
Australia's future and placate foreign nations. Case study examples will illustrate how similar
spin spans the gap of the political divide to extend party longevity. As rhetoric often precedes
the enactment of legislation, it is useful to understand why and how elected members
advocate certain refugee policies prior to turning our attention to actual policy comparison.
In correlation with formal party media monitoring assets, partisan groups utilise political
polling and focus group feedback to 'package' a policy directed at specific strengths or
opposition weaknesses. This is a rather Machiavellian world view of politics; however, it does
sound out and illustrate why there exists a subtle difference in party policy. This is illustrated in
this chapter by again unpacking the rhetoric attached to individual policy decisions on both
sides of the political divide. In discussing the rhetoric employed by both parties, it can be
demonstrated how these tools are utilised to place their masters in the best possible light.
Both parties have expressed tough talk on border control measures whilst in government and
opposition, nevertheless eschewing the race debate. Mandatory detention has been and
continues to be a required policy, however bipartisan rhetoric has been relatively low key in its
substance and use. As noted previously, the greatest divergence can be seen in the placating
of constituents through rhetoric associated with habitual party favourites.

Boats, Votes and the Media
The acuteness of the MV Tampa issue provides an excellent example of the relationship
between media coverage and party rhetoric. John Howard had no doubt as to the power of the

20

Canberra press gallery. As Errington and van Onselen (2007, pp. 156- 159) illustrate, the public
backlash experienced by Howard after his 1988 remarks as Opposition leader remained firmly
embedded in the prime minister's mind.

14

Taking the lead on this issue, as one benefit of

incumbency allows, the Coalition framed the debate in terms of border protection rather than
facing the scrutiny of elite Australian critics for refusing access to asylum seekers and possible
refugees. This hard lined rhetoric encapsulated the government's official response to onshore
asylum seekers.
Border protection rhetoric is illustrated by Senator Christopher Ellison in his address to the
Senate in August of 2001 during the second reading of the Border Protection Act 2001. The
Coalition government's position is conceptualised by Senator Ellison statements. In her thesis,
Every (2006, p. 168) outlines Senator Ellison's reciprocal use of the notion that the MV Tampa
was attempting to enter 'our territorial waters' and come along side with 'our territorial land'
without consent and even against our explicit direction to do so (Hansard, 2001, p. 26970). By
utilising the notion of ownership, national territorial ownership, the government spokespeople
achieved two outcomes. As mentioned in chapter one, Ellison is now drawing the public's
attention to Linklater's (2008, p. 544) theories of identity and nationalism. Ellison reminds the
national populace that these people are initially defying Australian sovereignty, which is a
nation's right to admit whom it shall and remove those that it wishes in accordance with
Australian law, and secondly drawing the nation together by expressing and emphasising our
collective commonness (political and social integration) against a perceived or real threat. This
framing characterised the position of the Coalition and is distinct from the ALPs associated
rhetoric and displays a divergent point between the two parties.
The perpetual and permanent campaign intrinsic to modern day democracies is well noted. As
Errington and Miragliotta (2007, p. 101) explain, 'the permanent campaign is the use of the
resources of government to promote a political party over the entirety of the parliamentary
cycle'. An apt example of this in practice is highlighted by Errington and van Onselen (2007, p.
301) in which a conversation is quoted between MP Jackie Kelly, the minister for Sport and
Tourism, and the Prime Minister (PM) in late August 2001. This rhetoric appeals to her
constituents or 'Howard battler territory' and a wider demographic so named by Howard as
the 'decent conservative mainstream of Australia' (Errington and van Onselen, 2007, p. 304).
Minister Kelly speaking to the PM said, 'One Nation is just chewing us up, I've lost two
14

As leader of the Opposition, John Howard in 1988 remarked via broadcast radio that the rate of Asian

immigration should be reduced in the interests of social harmony (Harris, 1993, p. 27).
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branches to them; one of them is my best fund raising branch. We need to do something or I'm
a goner.' Howard was on his way to Question Time in the House of Representatives and replied
'Don't worry Jackie, That's all about to change.' A Dorothy Dixon question was posed to the
PM by Teresa Gambaro, The Member for Petrie asking, 'There have been reports of a boat
foundered in international waters necessitating a rescue at sea. Does this have any
implications for Australia?'

(Hansard, 2001, p. 30234) The PM replied with an abstemious

tone, 'We have indicated to the Captain that permission to land in Australia will not be granted
to this vessel'. Howard's intent was designed to reassure the public that his focus was in touch
with Australia's sovereignty over other legalities and responsibilities of an international citizen.
The angle taken by the Coalition on this matter appealed to MP Kelly's constituents and has
been widely noted by academics (Mares, 2002, p. 136).
However, the Coalition's rhetoric and strategies are by no means isolated as a solitary tool
utilised for political expediency.

The ALP has practised this art with relatively ruthless

implementation when external factors bear on the plight of refugees. Foreign policy can have a
dramatic effect on the rhetoric used by incumbent governments on certain refugee issues.
The ALP Foreign Minister (1988 to 1996L Gareth Evans argued in defence of the Cambodian
Peace Plan, supported by Prime Minister Hawke maintained the line that these refugees
represented 'economic' refugees and therefore raised the question of validity of Cambodian
boat people in 1989 and 1990 (Parkin, 1990, p. 332; Kneebone, 2006, p. 247). Arrivals on
Western Australian shores drew attention to the effectiveness of the Cambodian Peace Plan
and the subsequent repatriation of refugees to Cambodia. Added to the PM and Minister
Evans comments on the validity of boat people as refugees can be Prime Minister Keating's
suggestion that East Timorese refugees should go to Portugal (Mares, 2002, p. 30). This was at
a time of cordial bilateral relationship between the PM and President Suharto of Indonesia.
The Prime Minister, Paul Keating, openly stated on Perth radio: 'Timorese people have
Portuguese citizenship, so, they have no refugee status ... those people still have Portuguese
citizenship status'. These comments, as expressed by Mares (2002, p. 31) are corrosive and
damage the public perception of valid and in particular UN convention refugees. Furthermore,
the free press must question the motifs of politicians on these comments and should go
deeper into related areas that explore other reasons for the political discourse expressed by
key members of government. Mares (2002, p. 32) goes as far as stating that publicly attacking
refugee validity is an overt political act often designed for positioning the government
favourably in light of its foreign policy direction. The examples above illustrate rhetoric that
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not only appeases regional foreign nationals' relationship with Australia, but fits within the
wider direction that Keating ascribed to for Australia's future- engagement with Asia.
Visa Categories and Ministerial Direction

The ALP response to the Fitzgerald report commissioned in 1987 and submitted in 1988
identifies key issue drivers for its constituents.

The report states for part of its

recommendations for time frame and program size that, 'there be a program of 150, 000 per
annum from 1988/89 to 1990/91...That the composition of the program for the three
years ... be as follows: i) Category A (Family Immigration) to remain self-determining, but likely
to increase to about 40,000; ii) Category B (Refugee/Humanitarian) be increased to 15,000; iii)
Category C (Open Category[skilled]) to form the balance of around 95,000'

15

.

So, in addition to

supporting a relatively moderate increase in the refugee/humanitarian category of 3,000
positions, and a similar increase in the family reunion category, it also calls for a considerable
increase in an 'open' category to specifically attract skilled and educated individuals to
enhance Australia's economic prospects moving into the twenty-first Century (Fitzgerald,
1988, p. 122) . A consistency in rhetoric between the parties can be noted in both the Prime
Ministers and the Immigration Minister's responses soon after the release of this report.
McMaster (2002, pp. 55 -59) draws the example of the arrival of a few hundred Cambodian
boat people from 1989 to 1991, in which he notes that Hawke condemned the arrivals as
'queue jumpers and economic refugees'. Prime Minister Hawke declared, 'let no one think that
we're just going to stand idly by and allow others, by their autonomies action which reflects
perhaps some unhappiness with the circumstances in which they find themselves in their
-

country ... to determine our immigration policy'(McMaster, 2002, p. 57). As previously noted,
this was not the first time Hawke had criticised refugees for as ACTU national president in 1977
he publically announced that the government should 'Return Bogus Refugees' and stop them
from 'Jumping the Queue' (Rodd, 2007, p. 36). This rhetoric was aptly supported by Hawke's
Immigration Minister, Gerry Hand, by his statement declaring that 'if these people turned up
they would stay confined until they were assessed' (McMaster, 2002, p. 57).

Counter

assumption or arguments that external forces mitigated the entry of these asylum seekers is
relatively weak if not invalid altogether, due to a concomitant admittance of approximately
30,000 Chinese students in 1989 on temporary protection visas by the Hawke government.
Brennan (2003, p. 39) supports McMaster's position by quoting the Trade Minister, Neal
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Prior to the publication of Fitzgerald's report, the net immigration level reached 113,540 in 1987. This

sum included all three categories; skilled, humanitarian and family (York, 2003, DIM lA).
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Blewett's official correspondence in which he stated 'the boat people were going to be treated
as illegal immigrants and repatriated'. He further draws attention to the Immigration Ministers
Hand and Bolkus openness in parliamentary discussion of the need of deterrence as part of
'rationale for detention'. The essential point drawn from this case example is that of bipartisan
support of deterrence policy towards onshore asylum seekers has been repeatedly and
explicitly advocated by both the ALP and the Coalition.
Elections, Values and Detention

The mid nineteenth century United Kingdom political philosopher T. Green supported the
aspects of modern liberalism; in particular, the tenant of positive freedom (Heywood, 2003, p.
41). Following the work of J. S. Mill, Green saw individuals possessing social responsibilities
that emphasised having sympathy for one-another, displaying care and empathy for each other
and that they were capable of altruism. This notion is supported by the rejection of the
classical conception of liberalism that advocates humans are essentially 'self seeking utility
maximisers' (Heywood, 2003, p. 59). This optimistic line of thought has been characterised as
'Social-Liberalism'. Given this tenant of modern liberalism, if one ascribes to it, then it is of
little wonder that the Coalition chose to define the debate on the terms it did in 2001. The
predominant view of the Australian community supported mandatory detention and this was
displayed though polling that suggested respondents though the government was too soft in
its policy direction (Rodd, 2007, p. 42).
In 1977 and just prior to another Federal election the arrival of 181 Vietnamese refugees
aboard the Song Be stirred similar anxieties among the Australian press and public. Why was
public opinion angled in this direction? The minister for immigration Phillip Ruddock
strategically directed the argument of mandatory detention as attacks against people
smugglers and the nation's need for strong border protection policies. Ruddock's tone
emphasised that the people smugglers were 'well organised, ruthless, greedy and were
exploiting Australia's humanity and vulnerability' (Mares, 2002, p. 110). This effectively
bypassed any accusations that he or the government could be seen as blaming the asylum
seekers for their own plight. The rhetoric used to demonise people smugglers focused and
framed the debate that sought not to awaken any Australian public's notion's of Green's Social
Liberalism.
The Howard government's strategy was to protect our 'shared values' with strong rhetoric that
emphasised border protection and detention of individuals that chose to threaten this notion.
In this case, the alternative prime minister and leader of the Opposition, Kim Beazley
24

supported the Coalitions policy and his rhetoric additionally reminded the Australian public
that had been the Australian Labor Party that had initially implemented the policy

of

mandatory detention in 1992 under a Keating administration (Rodd, 2007, p. 44).
In addition, the prime minister played an important role in the debate surrounding the MV

Tampa and its human cargo. Howard, when on vacation in Singapore in the 1960s, witnessed
race riots. Errington and van Onselen (2007, p. 40) suggest this experience confirmed in
Howard a long-established concept that cultures struggled to coexist without assimilation. This
may have been in the back of the prime minister's mind with so many boat arrivals of unlawful
non-citizens to Australia in 2001 (4100 approximately and the vast majority where from middle
eastern decent).

However, Howard's support for his immigration minister's stance and

rhetoric is more likely due to the appeal this position had to his constituents which was
dramatically reflected in national polls in August 2001. This would also explain why the ALP in
opposition chose a me-too approach to policy on this topical election issue.

Conclusion
While the majority of party rhetoric exhibits similarity and continuity, there are a few
idiosyncrasies that reflect party loyalties. These loyalties reproduce the conception of the main
'perceived' differences in party policy. Initially both leaders, whether in government or
opposition, have utilised strong rhetoric when advocating the case for Australia's sovereign
rights of determination. Powerful rhetoric has also been applied to Australia's future direction
when concerns over changes in economic and social policy dominate the media agenda. A
tradition continued from John Forrest's speech over immigration in 1901 to John Howards
address to Parliament in 2001 in the wake of Tampa. However, leaders words have appealed
at times to specific constituents within the electorate that provide a support base for either
party. The rhetoric employed has been utilised to position the government of the day in a light
that is favourable to re-election and maintaining power. Overall, the media management
employed to enhance electoral longevity, through its pragmatic appeal to parochial
community values and fears, has not overtly impeded on bipartisan support for Australia's
official refugee policy.
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Chapter Three
Refugee Policy: Comparing Major Party Responses
Introduction:
The purpose of public policy is to derive an effective method for resolving social conflicts
(Lindblom, 1980, p. 11}. The refugee issue is a reoccurring social conflict that regularly occupies
the policy cycle of contemporary Australian politics. If the issue is cased as a 'problem',
boundaries can be identified and objectives defined. This turns the issue into a concern to be
solved. This is illustrated when examining the 'Pacific Solution' during the Coalitions term in
office: an ongoing commitment to an ongoing problem, a so called 'wicked problem'
(Bridgman & Davies, 2004, p. 43}. However, public policy is never as simple as implementing a
one off solution to a particular issue.
Australia's refugee issue continues to be well supported on the Governments agenda by an
array of forces (political, external and internal) that drive public policy. Refugee policy exhibits
aspects of political issue drivers from both party platforms, draws continued attention from
past and present immigration ministers and carries a great deal of historical weight in party
policy. In addition, the refugee issue gains support from external drivers which include;
economic forces, such as high levels of unemployment and subsequent welfare dependency
within the community, media attention, and international relations with regional governments
that incorporate foreign policy concerns. These two drivers are supported by the inherent, if
somewhat invisible forces that are contained within government. These include; regular
reviews and monitoring of existing policy, budget restrictions and expansions, and monitoring
of other nations capabilities of dealing with refugees (Bridgman & Davies, 2004, pp. 35 - 38;
see Figure 3.1 below: Refugee policy drivers). Although refugee policy enjoys a large quarter of
support across all three policy drivers, political, external and internal, the refugee issue is often
found at the front of the queue at Parliamentary Question Time when its political impact is at
its greatest; otherwise the issue is often relegated off the agenda for more mainstream
economic issues.
Consultation with political elites has demonstrated how policy has been implemented by
incremental change and not leaps and bounds. Bridgman & Davis, (2004, p. 47} describe the
resource and time constraints on politicians to seek outcomes for items currently listed on the
public policy agenda. The relative short attention span notated by the current and ever
quickening media cycle places an overburdening emphasis on politicians to achieve positive
resolutions, and achieve them quickly. A consequence of the short media and public attention
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span is a need to develop and implement policy swiftly. The facilitation of this necessity is
displayed by the incremental creep of policy. Critics argue that this form of policy development
often shortcuts the process and misses best practice initiatives due to the lack of a rigorous
and whole picture approach to policy outcomes through a lack of objectivity (Bridgman &
Davies, 2004, p. 48).
This chapter compares three key areas of refugee policy. Government policy dealing with
onshore asylum seekers, unlawful entrants and what are commonly termed 'boat people' will
be explained, from the ALP's rejection of Cambodian asylum seekers in 1989, to the Coalition's
implementation of the 'Pacific Solution' in 2001. Mandatory detention and how this policy has
evolved and grown over time will be reviewed, with examples from the period under review
used to highlight party policy comparisons. Finally, visa categories and the shifts that have
occurred over the years will be looked at to highlight both the successes and failures on both
sides of politics.
This chapter is central to the thesis because it aims to specifically highlight the overall
similarity in policy approaches across both major political parties. It seeks to display a high
level of bipartisan support provided to policy even in direct contrast, at times, to party rhetoric
in the media. In addition, this chapter compares examples of policy not only within the
Australian political context, but also with international programs, cost benefit analysis and the
social and legal impact of ALP and Coalition policy through its collapses and accomplishments.
Australia's Unique Reaction to Boat People

The Howard Coalition government (1996 - 2007) employed policies adhering to economic
liberalism and social conservative values (Torrens, 2009). Liberal economic policies are
displayed through an emphasis on free trade, privatisation and the efficiency of the capital
markets. A higher level of skilled immigration is argued by business lobbyists to drive labour
costs down and stimulate economic growth (Kabala, 1992, p. 17). Indeed, the case has been
argued by both parties that increased immigration supplements and encourages job growth in
Australia (Parkin & Hardcastle, 1994, p. 433). Skilled applicants are subjected to a point
scheme, in which education levels, English literacy and capital wealth are weighted to
determine suitability for entry under this stream of Australia's immigration target (Fitzgerald,
1988, p. 86).
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The Hawke and Keating ALP in comparison with the Howard Government displayed policies of
compassionate social wellbeing and the opportunity for equity. 16 Lower immigration levels
during periods of high unemployment have been the hallmark response by the ALP due to
pressure from within its factions and from peak bodies such as the Australian Council of Trade
Unions (ACTU) (Kabala, 1992, p. 11)17 • This has been coupled with higher levels of family
category quotas in times of economic stability and growth. The family category has witnessed
a great deal of advocacy and support from the ethnic lobby (peak body- FECCA) of resettled
migrants in Australia (Parkin & Hardcastle, 1994, p. 438).
This being the case, the parties' divergence on levels of skilled verses family reunion intake is
not replicated in the humanitarian or refugee scheme of immigration policy. As previously
stated, both the ALP and the Coalition_ have maintained a commitment to international
refugees since 1973 that approximately resides at ten per cent of the overall annual
immigration intake. This figure has fluctuated with the overall intake increases and reductions;
however the percentile has remained constant and enjoys unanimous bipartisan support
(Parkin & Hardcastle, 1994, p. 440; see Table 3.1 below).
Table 3.1 Overall Immigration I Humanitarian intake Ratio
Year

1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
16

Overall annual

Humanitarian

Percentage of

immigration intake
93 010

component
17 054

total
18%

68 820
77 510
92 590
113 540
143 480
145 320
121230
121690
107 391
76 330
69 768
87 428
99139
85 752

14 769
14 850
11840
11101
11076
10 887
11948
7 745
7157
10 393
11350
13 632
13 824
9 886

21%
19%
13%
10%
8%
7%
10%
7%
7%
14%
16%
15%
14%
12%

In addition to social equality policies, Keating and Hawke deregulated wages, floated the dollar and

reduced tariffs as part of ALP economic policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Anson, 1992, p. 151).
17

This trend is also reflected today in immigration cuts under the Rudd Government's response to the

present Global Financial Crisis by Immigration minister Chris Evans (Lunn, 2009).
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1998
77 327
1999
84143
2000
92 272
107 366
2001
2002
88 900
Source: York, B (2003). DIM lA, Parliamentary

8 779
8 790
7 267
7 625
6 732

11%
10%
8%
7%
8%

Library, Social Policy Group.

The philosophical differences outlined above have given way recently to partisan support that
displays little to no difference in policy. Convergence between the major parties has been
articulated as 'Tweedle Dee and Tweedle Dum' by some contemporary political scientists and
is expressed in both economic and social policy agendas (Errington and van Onselen, 2007, p.
123). Refugee policy has not escaped this trend.
After Australia's accession to the 1951 Convention, the first major benchmark in refugee policy
was the passage of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) which defines Australia's migration zone as:

migration zone: means the area consisting of the States, the Territories, Australian
resource installations and Australian sea installations and, to avoid doubt,
includes: (a) land that is part of a State or Territory at mean low water; and (b) sea
within the limits of both a State or a Territory and a port; and (c) piers, or similar
structures, any part of which is connected to such land or to ground under such
sea; but does not include sea within the limits of a State or Territory but not in a
port.
The Migration Amendment Act 2001 specifically removed Australian offshore islands from the
legal term 'migration zone' which has implications for asylum seekers wishing to make a claim
for refuge. This legislative change effectively provided the Commonwealth with another tool to
deal with prospective immigrants without visas. Under the old legislation asylum seekers, most
notably 'boat people' would be able to claim asylum and refugee status once land fall was
reached on the Pacific and Indian Ocean Islands (specifically Ashmore Reef and Christmas
Island). As a result of the 2001 amendments, these islands are now excised from the migration
zone and separate from the general laws of the land (Crock & Saul, 2002, p.102; Mares, 2002,
p.167).
The Migration Amendment Act 2001 was coupled with a 'deter and deny' policy that was
designed to be enforced by the Australian Defence Force and the Department of Immigration
and Multicultural Affairs. The Royal Australian Navy was to physically deny suspected illegal
entry vessels (SIEV) access to Australian territorial waters by means of refuelling and
resupplying, ensuring the sea-worthiness of vessels and if need be towing them back out to
sea and pointing them in the direction of Indonesia (Mares, 2002, p. 126).
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Another amendment in 2001 to the Migration Act 1958 borderlines an infringement of our
own pillar of democracy. The fundamental right of the judiciary to review and interpret
legislation has been called into question with the circumscribing of refugees rights to have
their case for asylum reviewed by the Federal Court in Australia. Maley (2002, p. 8) and Mares

(2002, pp. 166 - 169) both articulate that the removal of access to this proceeding further
limits refugee rights within the Australian context. This 'privative clause', initially embedded
within the 1998 Judicial Review Bilt states that decisions reached by the Refugee Review
Tribunal (RRT) 'must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in
question in any court' (Mares, 2002, p. 162). This legislation may have been put in place to
facilitate a quicker and more efficient processing of refugee cases for asylum (automation)
which Maley and Mares fail to consider. However, it will lead to a less robust decision making
process for refuge applications under the 1951 convention.
The three factors highlighted so far, taken collectively, demonstrates the

Howard

government's response to an increase in onshore asylum seekers. These legislative, judicial
and policy amendments have a common goal; to deter further attempts by asylum seekers to
utilise the option of onshore processing. The majority of these amendments have been passed
with bipartisan support.
The drivers and concerns of Australia's border security during the Howard government tenure
can be seen in realist terms that derive state sovereignty or national security as their principle
focus. This of course, is in direct conflict with what Acharya (2008, p. 494) and Maley (2001, p.

351) refer to as human security. The majority of scholarly debate in this field argues from a
platform that places increased emphasis on the individual as opposed to the state (Mansbach,

2008, pp. 84- 85; Spiegel, 2004, p. 38; Baylis, 2008, p. 445).
The Coalition's policy position on border control in 2001 can be demonstrated by a broader
analysis of democratic reaction and response to the AI Qaida high-jacking and ensuing
asymmetrical warfare (Suter, 2008, p. 85). In an intuitive documentary, Noam Chomsky
(Tetsujiro, 2002) offers his analysis of the events of September the eleventh (9/11) and their
complications. He advocates that a natural reaction of power systems is to take advantage of
such a catastrophic event. Advantage is gained by passing legislation that under normal
circumstances would not pass public consensus and subsequently fail to pass through
parliament or congress. He also summarises that the 'programs, often harsh and repressive
programs', were already in place and the events of (9/11) did 'accelerate and intensify changes
that were already underway'. Australia wasn't unique in its response to the events of
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September eleven. Changes coexisted worldwide and included the USA PATRIOT Act (Suter,
2008, p. 90), changes to Japan's constitution and Australia's introduction of the Border

Protection Act 2001. All additional legislation saw further restrictions placed on individual
liberties, and it is this fact that has impacted on refugee policy. As Mares (2007, p. 57) states,
Coalition policy did not diverge or overturn from past policies, but moreover built on them
with federal Opposition support.

This body of analysis clearly links the Coalitions policy

position to a western hemisphere's response for more robust national security.
Australia's Treatment of Asylum Seekers- Mandatory Detention

The opening of the Port Hedland detention centre in 1990 saw the beginning of Australia's
mandatory detention policy for unlawful non citizens entering Australia without any
accompanying documentation. This polh:y was a reactionary event to cover unauthorised
arrivals from Cambodia that began arriving on the Western Australian coastline in 1990 (Jupp,
2002, pp. 46 - 47). Labor's instigation of mandatory and irrevocable detention was supported
by a range of ALP federal ministers at the time.

Brennan (2003, p. 91), quotes a UNHCR

executive committee conclusion; conclusion number forty-four states that there are instances
that may require authorised detention in which 'people arriving have destroyed all
documentation; there are good grounds for holding them in detention until their identities
have been established and until health and security matters have been resolved'. Jupp (2003,
p. 59) illustrates that the continuance of policy here has left the Coalition with a troubled
legacy- a common perception of heartlessness and inhumanness.
The dramatic increase in refugee intake from onshore arrivals has not been met with the
benevolence of previous Coalition governments such as the Fraser government. In 1976 and
1980 amnesties were provided for unlawful over stayers; however, this has been the exception
to the rule, with no ALP or Coalition governments choosing this path since the Fraser
Governments time in power ended in 1983. The expanding level of unlawful non citizens
entering the country has required further areas for detaining asylum seekers whilst their
claims for refugee status are processed. The Coalition's response before 2002 was to increase
the number of detention centres on Australian soil. Therefore, Baxter (2002) and Woomera
(1999) were created to deal with the increases in onshore arrivals. The Coalitions continuance
of mandatory detention policy now diverges from the ALP on one considerable matter, that of
fiscal responsibility and economic rationalism.

Keating's reforms within the immigration

department stressed economic rationality. The aim during the early 1990s was to generate a
new self supportive department. Measures were introduced, such as the outsourcing of
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services to other departments, utilising the immigration department's skill sets, that of
interpretation and liaison and an airport departure tax, to raise revenue to offset the costs of
mandatory detention and deportation. The new processors were expressed legally through
two new Acts in 1991 and 1992

18

that captured the notion within the department that 'user

pays' is the policy direction now in effect. These measures were backed with fees for English
tuition, visa applications and appeal costs. The implementation of the 'Pacific solution' was not
a cost effective measure and this policy was in direct contrast to Keating's reform measures.
The retrospective legislation introduced in 2001 19 drew an expensive price tag for the
Australian public (Brennan, 2003, p. 106).
The fiscal year of 2001 to 2002 saw an increase of 159 million dollars to the department of
immigration for the explicit purpose of dealing with onshore unlawful arrivals to Australia. The
Coalition in addition saw fit to provide UNHCR and the International Organisation for
Migration {10M) with additional funding to handle the management of offshore asylum seeker
cases prior to their arrival in Australia's migration zone (Brennan, 2003, pp. 107 - 108). With
further increases in budgetary allocations in the fiscal year 2002 to 2003, up to 240 million
Australian dollars, clearly Coalition policy, continued from an ALP government has cost
Australian's dearly in its detention of asylum seekers.
Governments and Oppositions tend not to fight elections on this unfavourable ground. This
adverse ground is what Sun Tzu (2003, p. 71) refers to as crossroad ground, 'ground that one
should not attack on, either enemy or friendly force should contemplate action in these
circumstances'. He advocates that this terrain is one on which neither side has a particular
advantage and therefore it is mutually beneficial to avoid confrontation and to form alliances
until more favourable terrain can be discovered. Policy agreement is explicitly demonstrated
through Australia's actions towards onshore asylum seekers, loosely known as 'boat people'.
Under the Hawke administration and his first Immigration Minister, Stewart West, refugee
policy was adapted to allow entry to Chilean, Lebanese and El Salvadorian refugees to
Australia. This was a result of hardening right wing regimes displacing citizens with opposing
political views (Parkin & Hardcastle, 1990, p. 319). Australia adapted it's intake to cater for
these minorities and the governing administration enjoyed strong Opposition support on the
matter (Parkin & Hardcastle, 1990, p. 320).
18

This opposition support is identified via two

1991 and 1992 legislation: Immigration (Education) Charge Act 1992; Migration (Health Services) Charge

Act 1991
19

2001legislation: Border Protection Act 2001.

32

. editoria l articles (Pensabene, 1990, p. 2; Pensabene, 1993, p. 2) in which the Coalition firmly
states its adoption of a bipartisan approach to immigration and refugee policy. In fact the 1990
article is titled ' Immigration no longer divides the parties'.
Figure 3.1 Refugee Policy Drivers

Political
Issue
drivers

Budget Reviews

Economy
Media Attention

Internal

External

Issue

Issue

drivers

drivers

Under Minister Ray, the Immigration Minister from September 1988 until April 1990, the ALPs
policy adapted in line with recommendations from the FitzGerald report published in 1988.
Glyde Holding, Ray's predecessor, had commissioned a Committee to advise on Australia's
immigration policies within a six month timeframe. Its terms of reference were broad and
included; relationships between immigration and the economy, society and cultural
development. They explicitly granted the committee the scope to look at Australia's capacity
for significant intakes and key population issues (FitzGerald, 1988, p. ix). The main outcome of
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~his

report for policy was to limit the capacity of decision makers to control bureaucratic

decisions (automation), this process was to have minimal departmental interference and
allowed the department to be less susceptible to external forces and ad hoc effects on short
term decisions given the intense lobbying the department was capable of receiving. This
revised rule-based system provided categories for immigrants that consisted of family reunion,
skilled or humanitarian. The report called for increases across each category, but mainly a large
increase in the economic and skilled category. Jupp (2002, p. 48) also draws out that the report
was the precursor to a shift rational economic focus away from the more leftist humanist
concerns previously adhered too. Jupp sees the realignment of the department over this
period as a natural movement with the increasing consensus among public servants and
bureaucrats of the time towards economic rationalism.

With 'Economic Rationalism'

providing the key catch phase of the reform, one may have expected the humanitarian
element to suffer considerably. However, statistical data shows this not to be the case. The
consecutive years 1990 and 1991 saw a sharp rise in the number of asylum seeker applications,
from 12,128 to 16,743 with Australia accepting these additional numbers from UNHCR (UNHCR
Statistical Online population database, 2009). So with a change in focus of immigration policy,
refugees and those seeking asylum were not negatively affected under the ALP in the early
1990s.
Australia's Resettlement of Refugees

Once asylum seekers have arrived in Australia, been processed by the authorities and then
released into the community, they face additional challenges of resettlement in what is quite
often a foreign culture. This policy thus provides a critical area worthy of further analysis in
comparison of resettlement of refugees as permanent resettlement is the best possible
outcome for asylum seekers. A study conducted in 2002 by James Bell (et al) assessed the most
important factors for refugees returning to their original community of displacement are
indicative of the nature of concerns for all refugees requiring resettlement. A simple yes - no
dichotomy was used for data gathering by questionnaire of the problems of most concern to
refugees in acquiring a stable and productive future. Ranked in order of importance (see Table
3.2) these issues or problems consisted of availability of jobs- ranked first with eighty-five per
cent of respondents listing thjs category as a serious problem. Ranked second was a natural
progression of availability of money to buy goods - with eighty-two per cent listing this
category as a serious problem. Thirdly, sufficient food supply was listed by seventy-five per
cent of respondents as a serious problem. Down the list also came issues including; access to
medical care, to education, to housing and to clean water supplies (Bell, 2008, p. 144). This
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survey, although conducted on Afghani nationals in Pakistan refugee camps in 2002, outlines
the main concerns that refugees face when considering resettlement or repatriation to their
country of origin.
Table 3.2 Relative levels of Concern for Refugees Requiring Resettlement
Serial

Rank

Issue

Per cent acknowledging
serious problem

1

2

nd

Money to buy goods

82%

2

3

rd

Sufficient food supply

75%

3

1

Availability of jobs

85%

4

4th

Access to medical care

45%

5

6th

Access to education

41%

6

5

Adequate housing

43%

7

ih

Access to water

40%

st

th

Source: Bell, J. et al (eds.). Statistical methods for Human Rights. Springer (2008).

An analysis of ALP policy displays a range of reoccurring policy failures (Jupp, 1994, p. 38) that
continued under the Coalition, which consequently failed to address these during its tenure in
power.

Firstly, policy under Hawke and Keating consisted of a tendency to treat refugee

resettlement under the same banner as Non English Speaking Background (NESB) migrants
that entered Australia under a skilled or family reunion visa. This approach fails to recognise
the exposure to torture and trauma by refugees which necessitates further services often
required, such as counselling and Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSS) management. Post
the FitzGerald report, policy tended to outsource services in line with new economic
management, through the Community Refugee Resettlement Scheme (CRRS) with Christian
and Jewish welfare societies, together with state government departments bearing the brunt
of resettlement services. Keating's reforms and budgetary cuts instigated a series of
developments which included; the closing of reception centres, which previously facilitated
information transfer and housing coordination, and excessive waiting periods for adult migrant
English learning programs due to teacher shortages coupled with an increase in service
demand. Jupp (1994, p. 59) also outlines the under recognised need for translators and mental
health services personnel to deal with the trauma that refugees have often encountered on
their path to resettlement. The main policy failures identified by Jupp are present and
recognised by the survey conducted by James Bell in 2002. These as stated previously
consisted of access to employment, or the need to provide an 'affirmative action' plan for
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equal opportunity for refugees in employment and education, English speaking courses with
interpreters for minority groups with remote dialects, lack of housing and medical resource
information.
Furthermore, Jupp {2003, p. 38} states that (although this time in a 2003 survey of ALP policy
in opposition} there was a distinct lack of essential services (education, housing, medical and
vocation opportunities} supplied by the federal Opposition ministers Simon Crean and Julia
Gillard. He proposes that the ALP should support state government initiatives that combine job
training and job placement for refugees at the very minimum.
The Coalition's record is also worthy of further investigation for many desperate refugees.
Phillips (2009, p. 15} notes that under the Howard administration there was an overt change in
policy for potential refugees seeking asylum in Australia. Although recognised, UN Convention
refugees were granted asylum, it was only temporary, as opposed to permanent, after new
legislation enacted in 2001 by the federal government. Temporary Protection Visas (TPVs}
were designed to provide adequate protection to refugees until their country of origin was
deemed by Australian authorities as 'safe' to return to. TPVs did provide refugees with access
to essential medical and welfare services; however, due to the temporary nature of the visa
classification, access to resettlement services such as educational and employment facilities
were denied. Similarly, restrictions to travel and family reunion were placed to TPV holders as
these aspects were not deemed essential to their safety. The focus of this new policy was to
remove the option of permanent resettling of refugees in Australia with the main emphasis
now relying on a temporary 'safe haven' for individuals in need of protection. This policy drew
large amounts of speculation form critics such as Myra White (2004, pp. 76 - 77}, who argue
that receiving countries should be focusing on resettlement issues and not border protection
as the Howard Government had done. This policy fails to address key issues highlighted in
Bell's 2008 survey of Afghani refugees in Pakistan. Continuing on from the unsuccessful ALP
policy, refugees are denied access to vocational institutional assistance, educational programs
for long term security, and social/economic issues such as buying a home for future family
security and stability. 20

20

A note outside the scope of this study: the Rudd government has stopped the policy of issuing TPVs

and refugees are now, once assessed on health and character, granted permanency {Evans, 2008, p.2).
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To explain how and why the Coalition's policy is flawed, a comparison can be drawn here
between temporary migrant workers on 457 category visas and TPV visa holders that is worthy
of evaluation. Mares (2009, p. 1) sights the vulnerability of temporary work visa holders due to
their dependence on Australian employers to continue their gainful employment within the
specific industry. He specifically highlights the failure of current policy to address the
vulnerable status of migrant workers seeking permanency in Australia. Mares (2009, p. 3)
draws on the American political philosopher Walzer who advocates 'that anything short of
permanent immigration is morally unacceptable'. Walzer argues that if citizens of Western
nations bring in temporary labour schemes, then they must be willing to enlarge their
membership to enable temporary residents' permanency after a period of employment
providing constructive input to society. He equates temporary status working migrants with
live-in-servants that establish a second class of citizens. On a moral plane, the same argument
can be levelled at temporary protection of refugees. Although temporary protection has other
facets, such as providing a 'safe haven' in times of international crisis (Kosovo); temporary
entrants must have the ability to apply for permanency. This change in policy allows for the
reward of financial and psychological investment, both by refugees and 457 migrant worker
visa holders, in a future embedded within the Australian community.
Additionally, comparison between Hawke's conciliation and placating of ethnic lobby groups
and the resultant electoral success enjoyed by the ALP with Howard's adoption of policies
courting disillusioned marginal workers back to the Coalition shows a similarity. Parkin &
Hardcastle (1994, p. 438) argue that McAllister points out that the ethnic vote for Labor
candidates is disproportionate in the 'Southern European vote'. McAllister (1988, pp. 11 - 15)
argues that this vote swang national elections to victory (1983) that otherwise would have
been lost. In contrast, the Coalition government's policy direction can be seen in the swing of
the lower middle class worker, 'the Aussie Battler' back to the coalition in the 2001 election.
Conclusion:
The surprising extent of bipartisanship support for refugee policy in modern Australian politics
is reflected throughout the nation's short accession to international refugee law since 1973.
Consensus in policy formulation and execution has been widespread despite divergence in
major party support bases and party rhetoric dispersed via the media. A note worthy
inconsistency of fiscal irrationality displayed by the Howard administration as opposed to
Keating's reforms for a user pay scheme pales in comparison to the list of similarities. This
chapter demonstrates support exists across the array of policy issues with the continuance of
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ongoing mandatory detention, a steady ten per cent quota for the humanitarian element of
immigration policy, and delegation to state and local governments for refugee resettlement
services. Even controversial legislation and amendments to existing Acts have been passed
through Australia's rigorous parliamentary debate system with bipartisan support (minor
parties aside). These included the global trend to strengthen border security procedures and
assets under Howard's administration in 2001 and the provisional four year protection visas
granted to Chinese students under Hawke in 1989. Collectively, whether failed or successful in
its implementation, refugee policy has enjoyed long periods of bipartisanship support between
1983 and 2007.
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Conclusion
The gradual increase in the number of people seeking asylum globally in recent years has been
met by a similar increase in Australia's overall intake. It is a sign that despite public rhetoric
about strong border protection, Australia has looked to meet its international obligations on
refugee intakes. Regional push factors including statelessness, poverty, climate change and
conflict, all continue to place Australia's refugee policy under significant strain, more so than it
has previously been subjected to. Pressure for Australia to admit increasing numbers of bonafide refugees, from refugee advocate organisations, religious institutions, some academics and
journalists, has not always reflected mass public opinion. This situation has put incumbent
political parties in a difficult position from which to navigate the best public policy outcome.
Political rhetoric has been one method politicians have used to bridge the gap between policy
decisions and public attitudes. Government rhetoric, often expressed by the senior leadership
of both the major Australian political parties, has often displayed traits that can be drawn from
Australia's unique heritage and location. It has been subtly directed at gaining political mileage
in backing a policy direction which is subsequently reflected at the ballot box.
Reoccurring events illustrate how similar party responses are when the refugee issue is
dragged into the public focus. Hawke's adamant repudiation of Cambodian asylum seekers in
1990/91 as well as Keating's attack on their legitimacy is not that far removed from Howard's
symbology and supporting rhetoric of a strong stance on border control. Additionally, the
Opposition leader in 2006, Kim Beasley, supported the government's position on border
control in his press statements with an additional commitment to increase Australia's bor6er
protection with a bolstered coast guard. Recently we have seen the current Prime Minister,
Kevin Rudd, sharpen his rhetoric on asylum seekers so as not to lose popularity on the back of
some changes to processing conditions following his victory at the 2007 federal election. These
examples draw attention to the political price tag of modern day policy delivery. The purpose
of this method is to ensure party relevance at the electoral box by placating the party loyalists,
whilst acknowledging the opinion of mainstream voting public, to. avoid elite criticism and to
maintain Australia's international reputation for acceptance of refugees.
Official government policy responses to regional developments have highlighted party strategy
similarities. The response has been largely symmetrical. As an example of the affects that
external influences have on refugee policy, the ALPs negotiation for the repatriation of
Cambodian asylum seekers voiding the Cambodian Peace Plan highlights the government's
focus on furthering its relations with ASEAN member states. Similarly, the Howard
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administration's refusal to admit West Irian asylum seekers in 2006, due to Indonesian
concerns incorporating its autonomy, is a showcase for the priority of foreign relations over
and above humanitarian refugee policy outcomes.
Further to external considerations, political aspects of policy warrant attention. The political
fallout of unfavourable policy has the potential to unseat a government, especially in key
marginal electorates. The federal incumbents' willingness to adhere to sound political
decisions that maintain electoral viability is extremely similar. Howard's adoption of rhetoric
that emphasised border control over humanitarian acceptance placated large sections of
Australia's mainstream constituents. Coincidently, Hawke and Keating's placating of their
union constituents saw overall quotas of refugees and immigration generally decline during
Labor's period in power from 1983-1996 (although the relative margin still remained at ten per
cent), in particular during tougher economic periods in Australia. Both examples highlight how
politically astute leaders choose to adopt pragmatic refugee policies.
Ultimately, the fiscal considerations of refugee policy are the most divergent between the
parties. The largest divergence in policy is demonstrated by Keating's initiative for fiscal
responsibility by individual government departments that adopted a 'user pays' system in
contrast to Howard's all expenses paid off shore processing solution to increased levels of
asylum seekers. This former policy digression is currently being eroded by the ALPs newly
announced strategy in 2009, whereby it has been reported and coincidently not denied by the
prime minister that Australia is compensating Indonesia financially for the processing of
asylum seekers bound for Australia shores.
The key results of this study have extrapolated three main outcomes. The current state of
knowledge of the Coalition's refugee policy broadly reflected in academic literature and the
media is at odds with the author's contention that Australian political parties are highly
parallel in their refugee policy agenda.

These policies are a kin in several ways such as;

sustained levels of offshore refugee admittance through UNHCR processing facilities,
mandatory detention for administration proposes and federal displacement of settlement
services to state and local government areas of responsibility. Party rhetoric is also comparable
and analogous. Case studies have displayed similar notions attached to partisan rhetoric that
ring true for both ideological sides. It has been demonstrated that it is the audience that this
rhetoric seeks to capture and inform that is of the most divergence. Prime ministerial
leadership under both governments chose a pragmatic and realist approach to the delivery of
refugee policy and its wholesale deliverance through related expression.

40

Continuity and divergence for the current administration, and how it adapts to the ever
increasing number of refugees seeking assistance around the globe, will provide major
challenges into the future. The change of federal government in November of 2007 has
enabled the Coalition's policies to be considered in full in contrast to the Hawke/ Keating
policies that concluded with Labor's tenure in 1996. At the height of public debate around
asylum seekers and refugee treatment during the period from 1983 until 2007, government
policy robustly enjoyed bipartisan support in 2001. Party policy agreement on this political
issue predominantly escapes ideological differences and substitutes pragmatic policy for any
convictional tendencies held by the immigration minister and their leaders. The continuance of
bipartisanship demonstrated by parliamentarians under Hawke's decision to grant temporary
visas to Chinese students in 1989 and Howard's stewardship of the MV Tampa incident in 2001
are reminders of Sun Tzu's analogy. The Rudd Labor Government has continued the ten per
cent quota for refugees as part of their immigration policy, utilised Christmas Island detention
centre for refugee processing and mandatory detention, but additionally continues to down
play any adverse rhetoric of too many asylum seekers landing on Australian territory to claim
for refugee status. A further comparative study of the current administration may seek to add
additional weight to the argument that Australian political parties are bipartisan in their
approach towards refugee policy. One could conclude that this trend is continued as the major
political parties contend for the same 'middle ground'.
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